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I. INTRODUCTION
The need for technical support for nuclear safeguards grew out of the formation of the IAEA and the implementation of international safeguards in the 1960s. Around the same time, the United States began developing domestic nuclear materials controls and accountancy (MC&A) requirements. Both domestic and international safeguards regimes instituted quantitative measurements, or assays, of special nuclear materials (uranium and plutonium) as a fundamental requirement. As the IAEA initiated inspection activities at nuclear facilities worldwide, the need for portable nondestructive assay (NDA) equipment became apparent. This led to the development of a large array of portable NDA instrumentation over the following two decades [1] . Over time, the IAEA began to utilize installed equipment, which introduced new requirements for continuous mode operation and data collection [2] . This continuous data collection mode required new software and resulted in huge amounts of data that required storage and evaluation.
The nuclear renaissance will present opportunities and challenges for both growth in nuclear technology and for nuclear material safeguards. It is likely that the increase in the amount of nuclear material that is under international safeguards verification will increase faster than the manpower that is available for inspection activities. Technical developments in safeguards must address improved efficiency to handle the increase in load. Developments such as 'safeguards by design' and unattended mode of operation will play an important role. In general, equipment should not require a highly trained specialist to operate for practical application.
The nuclear renaissance brings not only expansion of the existing light water reactor (LWR) fleet, but introduces advanced fuel cycle concepts as well. One concept, the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, and the associated Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) Research and Development program, introduces advanced technologies to meet increased energy demand, minimizes the volume and heat load of used nuclear fuel, and employs both intrinsic and extrinsic measures to address proliferation concerns [3] . Under AFCI and other advanced fuel cycle approaches, plutonium and minor actinides from used nuclear fuel are recycled in a fast spectrum reactor. The recycling process employs group actinide recovery to avoid having separated plutonium, enhancing the intrinsic barrier to misuse. Extrinsic measures include the development of advanced safeguards technologies and systems to optimize the effectiveness of both domestic and international safeguards. Intrinsic features alone will not adequately address concerns of proliferation and misuse, therefore it is imperative that safeguards systems advance in concert with the nuclear fuel cycle.
A significant research and technology development effort will be required to provide the foundation for achieving enhanced nonproliferation in concert with advanced fuel cycles and as a result the AFCI research and development program has established a Safeguards Campaign (in addition to campaigns in Fuels, Separations, Reactors, and Systems) to focus both on near term demonstration of advanced safeguards technologies as well as foundational research for the longer term [4] . The Safeguards Campaign coordinates its activities with the Office of Nonproliferation and International Security, who are the lead for international safeguards. Technologies developed by the Safeguards Campaign will specifically address domestic safeguards requirements for u.S. advanced fuel cycle facilities and may serve as a foundation for advanced international safeguards.
II. HISTORY OF NDA DEVELOPMENT AT THE IAEA
The first safeguards inspection occurred in Sweden in 1962; however, the entry into effect of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970 greatly expanded the role of the IAEA in verification of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Today, the Safeguards Department is the IAEA's largest organization [5] . The NDA equipment developed for and used by the IAEA has traditionally focused on neutron and gamma-ray sensors because of their ability to identify and quantify most forms of nuclear materials. Many, if not most, of the techniques for measuring nuclear materials were developed for domestic safeguards in Member States during the two decades prior to the NPT. In general, this equipment was modified and improved to meet IAEA requirements. The IAEA has instituted a system to standardize equipment types in order to simplify maintenance and training requirements. Fig. 1 shows a collection of portable gamma-ray based instruments that the IAEA has developed (primarily through Member State support programs) over the past couple of decades. The improvement and miniaturization of the electronics such as the Rossendorf multichannel analyzer (bottom) for data collection and analysis has resulted in orders of magnitude reduction in size of this type of instrumentation. Also, the progress of portable computers has been phenomenal. A wide range of equipment based on gamma-and x-ray detection has been developed for nuclear material safeguards [6] , [7] . The neutron system electronics have benefited from the miniaturization trend, but the detector heads have remained relatively large in order to maintain high detection efficiency for fission spectrum neutrons. Fig. 3 shows the largest neutron detector that has been used for uranium and plutonium safeguards measurements with a sample volume of 7.5E+3 liters. This system, using 3He gas detectors (the standard in safeguards instrumentation) is used to measure 244Cm and 240pU in reprocessing waste crates, and illustrates miniaturization is not the trend for neutron detectors [8] . In the mid 1980s, a new paradigm was introduced in that portable NDA equipment was no longer adequate to verify the nuclear materials in large-scale automated plants. Throughputs were too high and nuclear materials could not be removed from the process lines to be measured in portable equipment. This led to the development of installed NDA equipment that operated continuously. This continuous data collection and analysis required the development of extensive software and electronics. Data transmission and authentication issues became very important to the IAEA and the facility operator. The explosion of data and information presents a real challenge to the safeguards regime, but, on the positive side, the effectiveness of the safeguards system has been significantly improved by installed equipment operating continuously in the absence of inspectors. Measurement data that shows the movement of nuclear materials inside the facility on a 24 hour basis significantly improves the traditional containlTIent and security systelTI, and can be used as an 'added measure' for safeguards [9] . The JOVO underlying core approach for all of these neutron counting methods is time correlation analysis, whereby the multiplicity of the fission process is exploited [10] . Fig. 4 shows a time line for the development and use of safeguards equipment by the IAEA. The early period in the 1970-80 decade was focused primarily on portable equipment such as the High Level Neutron Counter (HLNC) shown in Fig. 2 ; however, in the mid 1980s largescale automated fabrication plants were coming online and installed inspection equipment was needed. For the decades of 1980-90s, the IAEA introduced unattended NDA and monitoring systems in facilities in many countries around the world. The data is collected real-time and the remote transmission of the information has required both technical and political advances. 
III. RESPONDING TO FUTURE CHALLENGES
At present, the driving force in advancing safeguards at declared facilities is the sheer growth of LWR deployment and recycle of plutonium in the form of MOX fuel for existing LWRs. This evolution has driven safeguards instrumentation to transform from portability as the key attribute to accuracy and facility integration being key as equipment was installed in facilities and operated in unattended mode. As nuclear power continues to grow, 3041 there will be increased attention to fuel cycles that go beyond LWR and MOX recycle in LWRs. Itnplementation of these new concepts provides a new itnpetus for safeguards technology research and development and presents an opportunity to integrate advanced safeguards and nonproliferation enhancements from the very beginning.
A. Large-Scale Facilities and MOX Recycle in LWRs
As throughputs of large-scale facilities increase, thereby challenging the timeliness goals for diversion detection for MCNPX simulation diagram of the Underwater MOX Verification System (UMVS) designed for the in-situ verification of the plutonium content in fresh MOX assemblies in reactor storage pools. both domestic and international safeguards, 'added measures' are being developed to supplement traditional safeguards accountancy methods. For reprocessing plants, the added measures include process monitoring of the solutions in the head-end and of plutonium powders in the nitrate-to-oxide conversion area. In the case of MOX fuel fabrication facilities, developments are in progress to monitor the movement of plutonium in the process line glove boxes. An example of an advanced safeguards system that can be used for both process monitoring and holdup measurements is the Glove-box Unattended Assay and Monitor (GUAM) system illustrated in Fig. 5 . This system utilizes the shielding of the glove box structure itself as part of the neutron detector and provides sensitivity over the entire glove box volume. Neutron counting pulses from plutonium throughout the box are collected continuously in LIST mode electronics and stored in a computer database. Software extracts the singles and coincidence mode data to quantify the mass and approximate location of MOX. The time history of MOX movement is also recorded by the system and provides an added measure of verification for safeguarding the facility. A prototype of the GUAM system is being tested at the PFPF facility in Japan [11].
•• . ., Increased use of MOX recycle in thermal-neutron reactors is already in progress in Europe and Japan. The quantity of plutoniutTI in the assemblies is large and advanced verification methods are needed. New instruments are under development for use by inspectorates to verify the un-irradiated MOX assemblies at the fuel fabrication plants and in pool storage at reactor sites. Fig. 6 shows the Underwater MOX Veritication System (UMVS) that is currently under development to verify the MOX assemblies without requiring movement of the assemblies in the storage grid. The system uses passive neutron counting (based on 3He detectors), with a cross-talk neutron multiplication correction [12] . Fig. 7 shows results of the MCNPX simulations exploring method sensitivity. 
B. Addressing Advanced Fuel Cycles ofthe Future
Advanced closed fuel cycle concepts~in particular those in which minor actinides are retained as part of enhanced nonproliferation and waste management considerations will bring to bear additional challenges to the safeguards system and \vill thereby require a focused research and technology development effort. The current suite of advanced safeguards instrumentation and associated support systems represents a starting point for evolutionary development efforts and in some cases accommodation of these new material properties may not stress the performance of existing techniques much. On the other hand~new methods may be required in some cases. The AFCI Safeguards Cmnpaign is investigating new approaches and methods along both of these lines to advance the state of the art for domestic safeguards. Close coordination with the Office of Nonproliferation and International Security is maintained in order to optimize potential benefits to international safeguards.
The ability to measure plutonium in the presence of minor actinides is a natural target for advanced instrumentation development since the application could be either the head-end process of an advanced recycling facility as well as some advanced fuels. In addition to the characteristics presented by these materials needing to be addressed by new techniques and methods, their dose levels will require remote handling using hot cells. Initial scoping studies were recently carried out where minor actinide bearing oxides fabricated as part of the Fuels Campaign were measured using standard neutron and gamma-ray equipment. As part of this investigation, NDA equipment was introduced into hot cells at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to perform the measurements and subsequently removed, with one of the neutron counters being shipped to Oak Ridge National Laboratory to be installed and tested in a hot cell where used nuclear fuel is being processed as part of the Separations Campaign. Fig. 8 shows the LANL hot cells, minor actinide bearing oxide fuel pellets, as well as neutron and gamma-ray detectors systems inside the hot cell. Preliminary results of these measurements indicate interferences in both the standard neutron (via high (alpha,n) rate and likely energy spectrum) and gamma-ray (via direct spectral interference) measurements [13] . Future efforts in this area will address these interferences via advanced data analysis and detector design. Advanced gamma-ray spectroscopy techniques have been detnonstrated in the laboratory that increase the resolution by more than a factor of lOx relative to the best high-purity gennanium crystals available [14] . This increased resolution would remove the interference observed.
A survey of advanced safeguards techniques has been done, where several NDA methods of varying degrees of maturity have been identified [15] . These techniques include both passive and active approaches. No single method will provide a complete solution to this measurement problem, rather a combination of techniques will be required.
Other areas of instrumentation research and technology development that are under investigation or that have been identified include a) advanced process monitoring techniques, both radiation and non-radiation based, b) adaptation of existing methods for application to 3043 electrochemical processing (where there is no accountability tank as in the case aqueous processing), and c) associated nuclear and chemical fundamental data to enable ne\v techniques [16] .
C. Safeguards by Design and Data Integration
In addition to advancing the state of the art in instrumentation, new approaches to the design of safeguards systems and associated methods of data integration, validation and security, and real time analysis are needed.~Safeguards by design' refers to the incorporation of safeguards and security features into facility design as full and equal partners in the design process. This concept is similar to safety in design, which is codified in the current U.S. regulatory structure. A similar level of formality for safeguards will integrate facility operations and domestic safeguards systems in a way that should benefit both.
In addition to optimizing the safeguards design features of new facilities, an integrated and holistic view of the status of advanced fuel cycle facility operations is required to maximize the utilization of all available data. This requires integration of disparate information in a manner such that quantitative statements and conclusions can be drawn in near real time. Such capabilities will greatly enhance the transparency of fuel cycle facility operations and lead to overall higher confidence in the nuclear energy enterprise. Advanced modeling and simulation will playa crucial role in this area.
IV. SUMMARY
The nuclear renaissance currently underway is providing the driving force for a new era of research and technology development to support advanced safeguards. As was the case during the initial period of base technology development in support of the expanded role of the IAEA under the NPT, advances in safeguards technology will arise from a combination of developments under both domestic and international safeguards research and development programs.
